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NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

[REDACTED] the United States could encourage the establishment of nuclear-free zones where it is the consensus of the countries in a particular geographic region that such a zone should be established.

Countries in such zones would be subject to the following obligations:

- a. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons or vehicles primarily designed for delivering such weapons, not to seek or to receive assistance from any other state in the manufacture of such weapons and vehicles, and not to acquire such weapons and vehicles in any other manner;
- b. Not to permit the storage, stationing [or testing] of nuclear weapons or vehicles primarily designed for delivering such weapons in the territory under their jurisdiction and control; and

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Such countries would be further obligated to accomplish the disposal or withdrawal of such weapons and vehicles as may presently be in the territory under their jurisdiction and control.

States possessing nuclear weapons and vehicles primarily designed for delivering them would undertake to cooperate with and respect such arrangements.

In presenting or adopting this position the United States should point out that its present feasibility varies among the different regions of the world:

1. Latin America -- A nuclear-free zone in Latin America would appear feasible and desirable at the present time. A Latin American nuclear-free zone should include all of the Western Hemisphere south of the U. S. border with the possible exception of territory under the jurisdiction and control of the United States.

[REDACTED] In supporting such an arrangement, the U. S. would have to be prepared to meet a Cuban argument that the missiles and strategic aircraft in the territory are required to deter a possible U. S. invasion. The Cubans might suggest that an arrangement for a nuclear-free zone should

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include a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba.

2. Africa - Similarly, it should be possible and would be desirable to achieve a nuclear-free zone in Africa. The United States should support such a zone, not only on its own merits, but also as a means of capitalizing on the interest which the African countries have already expressed in such a measure and formulating this interest on the problem of Latin America. In supporting an African nuclear free zone, the U.S. would have to consider the following problems:

1. [REDACTED]

From the standpoint of the French, a problem might arise in placing out further nuclear tests, although the French have committed themselves to stopping such tests in that area at some time in the future.

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view of Arab-Israeli

relationships the U.S. should probably be considered as part of a Middle Eastern zone rather than as part of an African zone.

3. Middle East - In defining a possible Middle East nuclear-free zone, the U.S. should consider that such a zone would include the MEE and extend through Afghanistan, but would not include Pakistan.

The following aspects need to be considered:

- a. Insofar as Turkey is concerned, two alternatives arise:

- (1) Since Turkey is a member of NATO, Turkey might be considered part of the European problem rather than the Middle East zone.
- (2) An alternative approach would be to include Turkey in a Middle East nuclear-free zone. The question of how to deal with Turkey would have to be considered in the light of other factors bearing on the possible need to withdraw offensive nuclear weapons from Turkey in order to achieve a

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settlement of the Cuban situation.
Inclusion of Turkey in a Middle
East nuclear-free zone might be one
way of introducing a new element of
negotiability in aiming at a Cuban
settlement while at the same time
reducing the risk of accidental war
in that area. Although such a zone
would not seriously affect the overall
Western deterrent, it would clearly
present political difficulties and would
necessitate substantial steps reaffirming
the United States commitment to the defense
of Turkey and to NATO as a whole.

b. Although Iran is a member of CENTO and would be
affected by a zone in the Middle East, the fact
that Iran has already committed itself not to
receive nuclear weapons on its territory appears
to allay possible repercussions for CENTO.

c. In view of the recent acquisition of rockets by
Israel and the UAR, such a zone would have a
real effect in stabilizing this area, if
agreement could be obtained.

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both would have to have the same status as
Pakistan, India, Japan, Britain, France, and
Philippines, and other major countries.

If Chinese Communist participation in such a
zone could be obtained on terms acceptable to the
U. S., the establishment of the zone would be
advantageous.

In this zone there would be a serious
risk of cheating by the participants with a
serious problem. From the U. S. point of view the
possibility that China might secretly continue with
a nuclear program would be a major consideration.
However, it seems unlikely that Communist China
could develop a successful program to the U. S.
and other countries of the zone without assistance by
U. S. military personnel. If such assistance were
provided, the U. S. would probably maintain the
zone as a military base. The Chinese could
not be an effective participant.

The factor which would have to be considered
in setting up a zone would be the question of
whether or not the U. S. and the zone would
be included. In setting the Eastern boundary of
the zone.

the area, a possible boundary might be drawn within the zone, all of the Pacific (with the possible exception of Australia and New Zealand) south of the equator and that portion of the Northern Pacific west of the international date line.

From the standpoint of the U. S., the creation of such a zone would mean, in effect, the withdrawal of U. S. weapons and vehicles from territory under the jurisdiction and control of countries in the zone and, in order to reach agreement, from territory under U. S. jurisdiction and control in the zone as well.

A question would arise with respect to the ability of the U. S. to place in the zone ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Although such ships and aircraft could not be based in the zone, it would not, as a practical matter, seem possible to exclude them. Accordingly, the U. S. might consider offering a "no first use" commitment with respect to nuclear weapons carried aboard U. S. ships and aircraft in the zone.

3. Europe -- A U. S. approach along the foregoing lines would undoubtedly raise at the same time the question

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with the countries of Europe also under
an arrangement establishing a nuclear-free zone.
The U. S. would have to point out that the
situation in Europe is obviously more complex
than that in other regions where such zones might
be considered and that the U. S. believed that the
basic problem in Europe is that of removing existing
instabilities through appropriate reductions of
armaments and through related arms control arrange-
ments. The U. S. is prepared to go into such matters
in great detail but does not believe the establishment
of nuclear-free zones in other areas can, or need,
await resolution of problems which exist between the
NATO and Warsaw Pacts.

Implementation of Nuclear-Free Zones

With respect to implementation of arrangements along
the foregoing lines, the United States might have the following

in mind. Such arrangements would, as a general
matter, be negotiated by the governments
of states in a particular geographic region.
Obviously, special steps would have to be
taken in Latin America in order to secure
establishment of a nuclear-free zone there.

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For the countries participating in particular regional arrangements, could report to an appropriate organ of the UN on progress in implementing regional arrangements.

- a. Insofar as verification is concerned, primary reliance would presumably be placed on unilateral intelligence sources. Insofar as other verification arrangements might be required, such arrangements might involve either calling on the UN to provide observers or taking such other steps as might be better suited to the needs of the particular region in question.

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NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

[deleted] the United States could encourage the establishment of nuclear-free zones where it is the consensus of the countries in a particular geographic region that such a zone should be established.

Countries in such zones would be subject to the following obligations:

- a. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons or vehicles primarily designed for delivering such weapons, not to seek or to receive assistance from any other state in the manufacture of such weapons and vehicles, and not to acquire such weapons and vehicles in any manner;
- b. Not permit the storage, stationing [or testing] of nuclear weapons or vehicles primarily designed for delivering such weapons in the territory under their jurisdiction and control; and
- c. [4 lines deleted]

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Such countries would be further obligated to accomplish the disposal or withdrawal of such weapons and vehicles as may presently be in the territory under their jurisdiction and control.

States possessing nuclear weapons and vehicles primarily designed for delivering them would undertake to cooperate with and respect such arrangements.

In presenting or adopting this position the United States should point out that its present feasibility varies among the different regions of the world:

1. Latin America - A nuclear-free zone in Latin America would appear feasible and desirable at the present time. A Latin American nuclear-free zone should include all of the Western Hemisphere south of the U.S. border with the possible exception of territory under the jurisdiction and control of the United States. [lines deleted] In supporting such an arrangement, the U.S. would have to be prepared to meet a Cuban argument that the missile and strategic aircraft on its territory are required to deter a possible U.S. invasion. The Cubans might suggest that an arrangement for a nuclear-free zone should

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include a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba.

2. Africa - Similarly, it should be possible and would be desirable to achieve a nuclear-free zone in Africa. The United States should support such a zone, not only on its own merits, but also as a means of capitalizing on the interest which the African countries have already expressed in such a measure and focusing the interest on the problem of Latin America. In supporting an African nuclear free zone, the U.S. should have to consider the following problems:

a. [4 lines deleted]

b. [From the standpoint of the French, a problem might arise in phasing out further nuclear tests, although the French have committed themselves to stopping such tests in that area at some time in the future.]

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- c. In view of Arab-Israeli relationship, the Middle East should probably be considered as part of a Middle Eastern zone rather than part of an African zone.
- d. Middle East - In defining a possible Middle East nuclear-free zone, the U.S. should consider that such a zone would include the GAB and extend through Afghanistan, but would not include Pakistan.

The following aspects need to be considered:

- a. Insofar as Turkey is concerned, the alternatives arise:

- (1) Since Turkey is a member of NATO, Turkey should be considered part of the European problem rather than the Middle East zone.
- (2) An alternative approach would be to include Turkey in a Middle East nuclear-zone. The question of how to deal with Turkey would have to be considered in the light of other factors bearing on the possible need to withdraw nuclear weapons from Turkey in order to achieve a

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settlement of the Cuban situation. Inclusion of Turkey in a Middle East nuclear-free zone might be one way of introducing a new element of negotiability in aiming at a Cuban settlement while at the same time reducing the risk of accidental war in that area. Although such a zone would not seriously effect the over-all Western deterrent, it would clearly present political difficulties and would necessitate substantial steps reaffirming the United States commitment to the defense of Turkey and to NATO as a whole.

Although Iran is a member of CENTO and would be effected by a zone in the Middle East, the fact that Iran has already committed itself not to receive missile bases on its territory appears to alleviate possible repercussions for CENTO. In view of the recent acquisition of rockets by Israel and the UAR, such a zone would have a real effect in stabilizing this area, if agreement could be obtained.

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Asia and the Western Pacific - An Asian-Pacific zone would have to include Communist China, Siam, India, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and other nearby countries.

If Chinese Communist participation in such a zone could be obtained on terms acceptable to the U.S., the establishment of the zone would be advantageous.

In this zone more than any of the others the risk of cheating by the participants would be a real problem, from the U.S. point of view and the possibility that China might secretly continue with a nuclear program would be a major consideration. However, it seems unlikely that Communist China could develop a capability threatening to the U.S. and other countries in the area without detection by U.S. unilateral intelligence. If such cheating were detected, the U.S. could probably nuclearize the area considerably faster than the Chinese could develop an effective capability.

The factor which would have to be considered in defining an Asian-Pacific zone relative to the question of whether Australia and New Zealand would be included in defining the Eastern boundary of

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the zone, a possible boundary might include, within the zone, all of the Pacific (with the possible exception of Australia and New Zealand, south of the equator) and that portion of the Northern Pacific west of the International date line.

From the standpoint of the U.S., the creation of such a zone would mean, in effect, the withdrawal of U.S. weapons and vehicles from territory under its jurisdiction and control of countries in the zone and in order to reach agreement, from territory under U.S. jurisdiction and control of the zone as well.

A question would arise with respect to the ability of the U.S. to place in the area ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Although such ships and aircraft could not be based in the zone, it does not, as a practical matter, seem possible to exclude them. Accordingly, the U.S. might consider offering a "no first use" commitment with respect to nuclear weapons carried aboard U.S. ships and aircraft in the zone.

4. Europe - A U.S. approach along the foregoing lines would undoubtedly raise at the same time the question

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that the countries of Europe also enter into an arrangement establishing a nuclear-free zone. The U.S. would have to point out that the situation in Europe is obviously more complex than that in other regions where such zones might be considered and that the U.S. believed existing instabilities through appropriate reduction of armaments and through related arms control arrangements. The U.S. is prepared to go into such matters in great detail but does not believe the establishment of nuclear-free zones in other areas can or need, await resolution of problems which exist between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts.

Implementation of Nuclear-Free Zones

With respect to implementation of arrangements along the foregoing lines, the United States might take the following approach:

- a. Zonal arrangements would, as a general matter, be negotiated by the governments of states in particular geographic region. Obviously, special steps would have to be taken in Latin America in order to secure establishment of a nuclear-free zone there.

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b. The countries participating in a particular regional arrangement would report to an appropriate organ of the UN on progress in implementing zonal arrangements.

c. Insofar as verification is concerned, primary reliance would presumably be placed on unilateral intelligence sources. Insofar as other verification arrangements might be required, such arrangements might involve either calling on the UN to provide observers or taking such other steps as might be better suited to the needs of the particular region in question.

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